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Evolution of time preferences and attitudes toward risk
Abstract
This paper explores a general model of the evolution and adaption of hedonic utility. It is shown that
optimal utility will be increasing strongly in regions where choices have to be made often and decision
mistakes have a severe impact on fitness. Several applications are suggested. In the context of
intertemporal preferences, the model offers an evolutionary explanation for the existence of conflicting
short- and long-run interests that lead to dynamic inconsistency. Concerning attitudes toward risk, an
evolutionary explanation is given for S-shaped value functions that adjust to the decision maker's
environment.
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This paper is based on the hypothesis that individual decisions are guided by hedonic util-
ity. An individual who faces several alternatives will choose the one that promises the greatest 
pleasure, or happiness. Then, given that the properties of a hedonic utility function determine 
individual behavior, and individual behavior determines biological fitness, evolutionary forces 
will have shaped our utility during the long time in which the modern human being evolved. In 
this sense, hedonic utility can be considered as a reward system that induces individuals to make 
optimal choices, a view that is supported both by theory and evidence from neuroscience.1 As 
Irving Kupfermann, Eric R. Kandel, and Susan Iversen (2000) express it: “Pleasure is unques-
tionably a key factor in controlling the motivated behaviors of humans” (1007). For the econo-
mist, the interesting question is then about the properties of the evolutionary optimal reward 
system, and how these properties adapt to the environment in which individuals make choices.
The present paper reconsiders and solves a general model of the evolution of utility suggested 
by Arthur J. Robson (2001a), which predicts how cardinal properties of utility functions should 
adapt to the decision environment. It turns out that the optimal utility function will be steep 
in regions where decisions have to be made frequently, and where wrong decisions would lead 
to large losses in fitness. In those regions, even small changes in consumption will cause large 
changes in happiness. The evolution of context-specific utility functions is then shown to be 
optimal whenever the decisions our ancestors had to make arrived in distinct choice situations. 
The model can also be extended to incorporate learning about evolutionary relevant attributes of 
available options.
1 The somatic marker hypothesis by Antonio R. Damasio (1994) states that decision alternatives are evaluated 
according to emotions attributed to them. Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, and Damasio (2000) survey several 
studies that support this claim. In an experiment with monkeys, Camillo Padoa-Schioppa and John A. Assad (2006) 
identify neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex whose state represents the value of alternatives in choice situations. The 
orbitofrontal cortex is generally considered to be responsible “for linking food and other types of reward to hedonic 
experience” (Morten L. Kringelbach 2005, 691).
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The general model suggests several applications. Concerning intertemporal decisions, evolu-
tion may have endowed us with different utility functions for short-run and for long-run decisions. 
The model therefore provides an evolutionary justification for the “multiple-selves” approach to 
time discounting (see Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue (2002) for an 
overview), where dynamic inconsistency arises from a conflict between different decision mech-
anisms. This view has been corroborated by the results of Samuel M. McClure et al. (2004), who 
show that different parts of the human brain are active in short-run and in long-run decisions. 
The present model predicts that conflict between the “myopic” and the “farsighted” mechanism 
is more likely to occur if the decision maker is adapted to small payoffs in the short run. It also 
sheds light on the evolutionary role of precommitment as introduced by R. H. Strotz (1955).
In the context of attitudes toward risk, the model highlights an influence of environmental 
randomness which has not yet been discussed in the literature. Risk attitudes will be influenced 
not only by the technology that converts consumption into fitness, as in Robson (1996, 2001b), 
but also by the distribution according to which opportunities arise for the decision maker.2 The 
model then offers an immediate evolutionary rationale for S-shaped value functions as in pros-
pect theory (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979). Most interesting, it identifies the indi-
vidual’s reference point with the peak of the density that describes the availability of alternatives. 
This provides a clear prediction of the reference point, even in highly stochastic environments.
The contributions by Luis Rayo and Gary S. Becker (2007a, b) also deal with the evolution and 
adaption of hedonic utility. In their model, optimal happiness derived from income is a step func-
tion with a unique jump, which can be interpreted as the aspiration level an agent wants to achieve. 
The aspiration level can then be shown to adjust over time and in accordance with income levels 
of a peer group, given that payoffs are correlated over time and across individuals. This offers 
an evolutionary explanation for habit formation and peer comparisons, phenomena frequently 
observed in happiness surveys.3 The present paper addresses different questions, making use of 
a different model. While the underlying adaption mechanisms share similarities—in the sense 
that utility adjusts to the decision environment like an eye to the ambient brightness (Frederick 
and Loewenstein 1999)—the model outlined below derives utility as a tool to make reasonable 
comparisons between any pair of alternatives, as opposed to identifying only the best out of a 
large set. For the purpose of the paper, this turns out to be the appropriate starting point.
The paper is organized as follows. The general model and its solution are presented in Section 
I. Section II is devoted to the evolution of intertemporal preferences. Section III is concerned 
with attitudes toward risk. Section IV concludes. More formal material can be found in the 
Appendix.
I. A General Model
A. Description
The model in this section has been suggested by Robson (2001a). It has been solved there for 
an approximate evolutionary criterion, the probability of mistakes criterion. In the following, it 
will be solved under the correct objective, the expected loss criterion.
2 The literature, including William S. Cooper and Robert H. Kaplan (1982), Robson (1996), Theodore C. Bergstrom 
(1997), and Philip A. Curry (2001), has also highlighted the role of aggregate risk, which makes deviations from stan-
dard expected utility maximization evolutionarily optimal.
3 Larry Samuelson (2004) shows that relative consumption effects can be an evolutionary optimal way for the deci-
sion maker to utilize information about the state of nature contained in the consumption of others.
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Assume an agent repeatedly has to make choices between alternatives from a set χ = [a, b], 
which are identified with fitness. Thus, alternative x ∈ χ yields fitness x, where fitness could sim-
ply be thought of as the number of offspring.4 When making a decision, the agent does not face 
the whole set χ, but only two alternatives that are independently drawn from χ according to the 
same random distribution. The agent has to choose one of these alternatives. It will be assumed 
throughout that the random distribution can be represented by a bounded density f with finitely 
many discontinuities. The corresponding distribution function is denoted by f.
The distribution f represents the agent’s environment by describing the availability of dif-
ferent alternatives. For example, during good times, in fertile geographical regions, or under a 
favorable climate, large fitness alternatives will be available with greater probability than other-
wise. Changes in the environment can later be modeled through changing distributions. For the 
moment, the distribution is considered as fixed.
The agent is endowed with a hedonic utility function that assigns a level of pleasure or hap-
piness to each element in χ. The alternative that promises larger pleasure will be chosen. The 
question now is: which utility function leads to the largest expected fitness? It is motivated by the 
idea that evolution will eventually have “discovered” and selected this optimal function.
Without any restrictions on the set of admissible functions, the problem is trivial. Any strictly 
increasing utility function ensures that the better of any two alternatives will correctly be identi-
fied. This is, however, not a realistic assumption. Happiness cannot be perceived in arbitrarily 
fine shades, due to limitations of human sensory abilities.5 This constraint can be modeled by 
assuming that utility can take only discrete, albeit extremely numerous, values. In the following, 
the set of admissible utility functions is thus restricted to the set of increasing step functions with 
n ∈ ℕ jumps, each corresponding to a utility increment of size 1/n. As a result, the agent cannot 
distinguish two alternatives located on the same step of the utility function. Any choice between 
such alternatives will have to be random, and a mistake can occur. Clearly, different step utility 
functions will then lead to different levels of expected fitness.
The size of n measures the degree of the perceptual constraint, which vanishes as n → ∞,6 
while the assumption of utility increments of size 1/n ensures that utility is normalized to the 
interval [0, 1] for all values of n. In the following, results will be derived for the limiting case 
where n → ∞, motivated by the presumption that perceptual constraints do exist but are small. 
Also, the optimal limiting utility function turns out to be continuous. It is thus an easy-to-deal-
with approximation for a step function with a huge number of steps.
The problem of finding the optimal step utility function is equivalent to the problem of locat-
ing n thresholds in the set χ, where two alternatives can be distinguished only if there is at least 
one threshold between them.7 Whenever two alternatives are drawn from in between two neigh-
boring thresholds, the agent will choose the worse one with probability 1/2. Robson (2001a) has 
analyzed the problem of locating the thresholds to minimize the probability of such mistakes, 
obtaining a simple and intuitive solution, which will be replicated below. The appropriate evolu-
tionary criterion, however, is the maximization of expected fitness, or, equivalently, the minimi-
zation of the expected loss due to wrong decisions.
4 The case where alternatives are not directly equated with fitness levels is considered later in this section.
5 See, for example, Esther P. Gardner and John H. Martin (2000).
6 The assumption of a large but finite n is analogous to the limited perception constraint by Rayo and Becker 
(2007a).
7 This representation of the problem is in fact the one used by Robson (2001a).
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B. Solution
The problem is solved here in three stages. First, the density f is approximated by a sequence of 
step densities with finitely many steps, ( ˆ    fS)S∈ℕ, in a way that ensures uniform convergence to f as 
the number of steps grows to infinity, i.e., as S → ∞. The technical details of the approximation 
are given in the Appendix. Second, the problem of optimal threshold location is solved for these 
step densities, yielding utility functions for the limit as n → ∞.8 Finally, the behavior of these 
functions is examined as the step densities converge to f.
To obtain the utility of an alternative x ∈ χ for a fixed profile of n thresholds, the number of 
thresholds below x has to be multiplied by 1/n. Denote then by θn,S(x) the number of thresholds 
below x given that n thresholds have been located to maximize expected fitness under the step 
density  ˆ 
 
 fS. The resulting utility is given by un,S(x) = θn,S(x)/n. For comparison, let ϑn,S(x) be 
the number of thresholds below x if the probability of mistakes is minimized, yielding utility 
Vn,S(x) = ϑn,S(x)/n. The main result of this section, proven in the Appendix, can now be stated 
as follows:
THEOREM 1: for each x ∈ χ,
(1) V(x) ≔  lim   
S→∞  lim   n→∞ Vn,S(x) =  ∫ 
a
 
x 
 f (y) dy = f(x),
and
(2) u(x) ≔  lim   
S→∞  lim   n→∞ un,S(x) = c  ∫ 
a
 
x 
 f (y)2/3 dy,
where c = ( ∫a b  f (y)2/3 dy)−1 is a normalizing constant.
The limiting utility function V(x), which follows from minimizing the probability of mistakes, 
equals the distribution function f(x). The same result has been obtained by Robson (2001a), who 
solves for the optimal threshold positions directly.9 Intuitively, when only the mistake probability 
is concerned, many thresholds should be allocated to regions of χ where decisions have to be 
made with large probability, i.e., where the density f (x) is large. Avoiding mistakes in this region 
is particularly beneficial. The limiting utility function will then be steep in this region, resem-
bling the distribution function.
Evolution maximizes expected fitness, for which the size of mistakes matters as well. As the 
distance between two neighboring thresholds varies, both the mistake probability and the aver-
age size of a mistake between these two thresholds are affected in the same direction. The overall 
expected fitness loss between two thresholds then depends on the cube of the distance between 
them, making strong variations in the distances between thresholds undesirable. The evolution-
ary optimal distribution of thresholds is thus more even than indicated by the first result. In 
particular, this implies that the slope of u(x) will not vary as much as the slope of f(x), which is 
achieved by the concave transformation of f (x) in the definition of u(x).10
8 It is easy to show that an optimal solution to the problem exists for any number of thresholds n. Let  = {t ∈ [a, b]n | a 
≤ t1 ≤ … ≤tn ≤ b} be the domain of the optimization, where tk denotes the position of the kth smallest threshold in [a, b]. 
Clearly,  is compact. Since the loss function as defined in the Appendix is continuous, the statement follows from the 
Weierstrass Theorem. Should there be several solutions, the following results hold for any selection of them.
9 When the mistakes probability is minimized, the problem can be solved without the detour via step densities. This 
approach is not transferable to the case of loss minimization.
10 Clearly, u(x) and V(x) coincide for a uniform fitness distribution.
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Besides Theorem 1, the threshold model delivers an intuitive interpretation for the slope of a 
utility function. Since a large slope derives from a dense allocation of thresholds, one can think 
of marginal utility as the degree of attention devoted to the respective alternative. Marginal util-
ity will be large in areas where correct decisions are especially important. The curvature proper-
ties of a utility function then correspond to changes in attention.
C. Extensions
The analysis above proceeded under the assumption that choices are made between fitness lev-
els. In reality, however, choice is between consumption bundles, and we do unquestionably derive 
utility directly from consumption of various goods, rather than from their fitness value.11
To capture this, assume that the individual makes pairwise choices between alternatives from 
a set  ⊆ ℝ, which are independently drawn according to a distribution function G. The alterna-
tives are then mapped to fitness through a function ψ :  → [a, b]. This again induces a distri-
bution of fitness levels in χ, for which an optimal utility function can be derived as above. The 
utility assigned to alternative y ∈  then becomes u(ψ(y)), which will simply be denoted by u(y) 
(or V(y), respectively) with some abuse of notation.
For Theorem 1 to be applicable, the induced distribution of fitness levels needs to be represent-
able by a bounded density f (x) with finitely many discontinuities. This requirement is not very 
restrictive and can be ensured by various different joint assumptions on , ψ and G. For example, 
make the following (strong) assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2:  = [d, e], ψ is continuously differentiable with ψ′(y) > 0 for all y ∈ , ψ(d) 
= a and ψ(e) = b, and the distribution on  can be represented by a continuous density g.
Assumption 2 is by no means necessary for the theorem to be applicable, but it ensures that the 
induced fitness density f (x) is continuous, producing continuously differentiable utility functions. 
These functions, defined on , are
(3) u(y) = c  ∫ 
a
 
ψ(y)
 f (x)2/3 dx
for the expected loss criterion and
(4) V(y) = f(ψ(y)) = G(y)
for the probability of mistakes criterion. Closer inspection of u(y) reveals the following result:
PROPOSITION 3: under Assumption 2, the function u(y) is continuously differentiable with
(5) u′(y) = cg(y)2/3 ψ′(y)1/3.
PROOF:
Derive the induced fitness distribution function f(x) first. Since ψ is strictly increasing, f(x) 
= G(ψ−1(x)) holds. Therefore, f(x) is continuously differentiable under Assumption 2, with 
derivative
11 See Robson (2001a, 16) for evolutionary arguments why preferences over consumption are likely to dominate 
preferences defined on reproductive value.
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(6) f′(x) = f (x) = g(ψ−1(x))(∂ψ−1(x)/∂x) = g(ψ−1(x))/ψ′(ψ−1(x)).
Hence
(7) u′(y) = cψ′(y) f (ψ(y))2/3  = cg(y)2/3 ψ′(y)1/3.
The proposition shows that the slope of u(y) at y corresponds to a normalized weighted geo-
metric mean of the slope of the distribution function G(y) and of the slope of the fitness function 
ψ(y). The utility function u(y) therefore represents an intermediate case between the actual fit-
ness function ψ(y) (properly normalized) and the distribution function G(y). Intuitively, utility 
should again be steep in regions of  where decisions have to be made often. However, since 
the size of mistakes—measured in fitness—matters as well, utility should also inherit properties 
of the fitness function ψ. Specifically, when ψ is steep somewhere, thresholds should be spaced 
closely there, because a wrong decision is severely damaging even if the two alternatives are very 
close to each other. On the other hand, mistakes are not very damaging in regions where ψ is 
almost flat and all alternatives yield very similar fitness levels.
u(y) is twice differentiable at each y ∈  where g(y) and ψ′(y) are differentiable and g(y) > 
0, with
(8) u″(y) =  2 __ 
3
c  a ψ′(y) ____
g(y) b 1/3 g′(y) +  1 __ 3 c  a g(y) ____ψ′(y)  b 2/3 ψ″(y).
The second derivative of u(y) therefore corresponds to a weighted average (with varying weights) 
between the second derivatives of G and ψ. If, for example, the fitness function ψ is concave, util-
ity can still be convex if G is convex.
So far, the assumption of a one-dimensional set of alternatives  ⊆ ℝ has been made. The model 
can be extended to higher-dimensional sets  ⊆ ℝn, though, as long as there is a single-valued 
fitness function ψ :  → [a, b] and a distribution function G on  that induce a bounded fitness 
density f (x).12 As above, the optimal utility from an alternative y = (y1, … , yn) ∈  becomes
(9) u(y) = c  ∫ 
a
 
ψ(y1, … , yn)
 f (x)2/3 dx.
Clearly, the resulting indifference curves coincide with fitness isoquants. Under the respective 
differentiability conditions,
(10)  ∂u(y) _____∂yi  = c  
∂ψ(y) _____∂yi  f (ψ(y))
2/3
holds for all i = 1, … , n. Marginal utility is jointly determined by the density at bundle y’s induced 
fitness level, f (ψ( y)), and by the partial derivative of the fitness function, ∂ψ( y)/∂yi. Thus, it 
again reflects the importance of bundle y and specifically of its i’th component in decisions.13
12 The combination of a multidimensional set of alternatives and a single-valued fitness function is referred to as a 
“fitness landscape” in biology (Sewall Wright 1932).
13 Second partial derivatives can also be examined. The local curvature properties of u are again influenced by those 
of the fitness function and of the distribution function.
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D. Hedonic Adaption
A choice situation as described above consists of a set of alternatives , a fitness function ψ, 
and a distribution function G. For this situation (, ψ, G), an optimal utility function u :  → [0, 1] 
can be obtained. If the decision situations that our ancestors faced varied systematically during a 
human lifetime, evolution will have selected individuals whose utility functions accommodate to 
change. Hence an adaption mechanism can be thought of as a family of utility functions together 
with a rule, which specifies what function becomes active at what point in time.
Consider first the case of a changing environment modeled through a changing distribution 
function as discussed in Section IA. In general, adaption of utility will have to be triggered by 
perceivable changes in the environment, which were (and might still be) correlated with changes 
in G, which is itself not directly observable. For example, an accumulation of large payoffs by 
oneself or others will generally indicate that the environment has developed in a favorable way, 
and hedonic adaption will occur.14 Realized payoffs are, however, not the only possible trigger. 
If, for example, the nature of decision problems changed systematically with individual age, util-
ity should be expected to differ between age groups. Hedonic adaption to changes in G will be 
discussed primarily in the application in Section III.
Apparently, choice situations can also differ with respect to the set of available alternatives 
. Hunter-gatherers are frequently confronted with typical hunt decisions, involving the choice 
between different hunting strategies (which animal to hunt, which technique to use). The choice 
between different foraging strategies appears as a different decision problem, which can clearly 
be distinguished from the first one. Yet another choice situation will have involved the long-run 
choice between different areas of habitation. If individuals can distinguish these situations, evo-
lution should have endowed them with context-specific utility functions, each one tailored to a 
particular decision problem, and activated by the recognition of the respective choice situation. 
Within each of these context-specific choice mechanisms, hedonic adaption to the environment 
occurs as described above. Section II contains an application of this idea to intertemporal deci-
sion making.
E. Discussion
Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin (1997) (KWS) distinguish two notions of 
hedonic utility: “instant utility” is the pain or pleasure that an individual experiences during a 
temporally extended outcome, while “remembered utility” refers to the individual’s retrospec-
tive hedonic evaluation of the experience.15 They show that the latter is an accurate predictor of 
behavior: after individuals have first been exposed to different treatments and have learned about 
their implications, they choose to repeat the treatment for which they report the largest level of 
remembered utility. Surprisingly, this level differs systematically from reports on instant utility 
during the initial treatments, indicating substantial flaws in memory. The model at hand might 
help to shed light on this puzzle. It will be argued that instant and remembered utility perform 
different tasks and have thus been shaped by different evolutionary forces.
Assume that an agent finds itself in an entirely new decision environment (, ψ, G). For exam-
ple, unfamiliar plants become available at a new location, and the consequences of consuming 
them are still unknown. It thus takes an initial phase of experimentation during which the new 
14 This is essentially the adaption mechanism at work in Rayo and Becker (2007a, b), where realized payoffs contain 
information about the state of nature.
15 Temporally extended outcomes are treatments that last up to several minutes. KWS report on several studies 
where individuals were exposed to short films, medical treatments, and varying temperatures.
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alternatives are explored. Formally, the agent collects information (not necessarily consciously) 
about fitness-relevant characteristics of the new options and hence about the function ψ.16 This 
information subsequently finds its way into an optimally adapted hedonic utility function. By 
construction, this utility function determines decisions, and thus corresponds to what KWS call 
remembered utility. If an individual is asked to assess alternatives during later choice situations, 
it “remembers” their fitness-relevant characteristics and evaluates them accordingly. From this 
perspective, the expression “remembered utility” might be misleading, as optimal decision mak-
ers will remember fitness-relevant characteristics and report a current evaluation of them, rather 
than a recollection of previous hedonic experience.
In this interpretation, what could be the evolutionary role of instant utility? Any initial phase 
of experimentation must involve substantial dangers due to the novelty of alternatives. It is then 
clearly expedient to have a warning system that keeps track of all relevant information during the 
consumption of temporally extended outcomes. The main purpose of instant utility might thus be 
to give “a ‘stop’ signal” (KWS, 379) early enough to prevent enduring damage to the individual. 
Naturally, this warning system should account for only acute dangers and will not be able to 
judge overall fitness adequately. Therefore, instant and remembered utility will be only vaguely 
correlated, and it is no flaw if individuals do not remember past hedonic experiences correctly. 
Reports or physiological measurements of hedonic values will provide suitable predictions for 
behavior only if they are elicited in a framing that resembles an actual choice situation.
II. Intertemporal Preferences
A. Discrete Time Model
To apply the results of Section I to intertemporal preferences, the following model allows 
alternatives to differ both in payoff v ∈ [0, 1] and in waiting time t ∈ {0, 1, … , T}, after which the 
payoff is realized. Assume that the fitness of an alternative y = (t, v), evaluated at the point in 
time where the choice is made, is given by the exponential function ψ(t, v) = δtv, where 0 < δ < 1 
is a discount factor. There are various reasons for discounting delayed payoffs in such a way. If, 
for example, there is a constant hazard that the payoff vanishes while the agent waits for it, as 
in Peter D. Sozou (1998) or Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin (2005), the expected fitness of an 
alternative can be expressed as above. Alternatively, population growth (Ingemar Hansson and 
Charles Stuart 1990; Robson and Samuelson 2007) or declining fertility (Alan R. Rogers 1994) 
can be reasons for exponential fitness discounting.
Alternatives are drawn as follows. First, a waiting time is drawn according to strictly positive 
probabilities pt, t = 0, … , T. Conditional on t, a payoff v is then chosen according to a distribu-
tion function Gt(v) with continuous density gt(v). Issues related to returns on investment can be 
captured by the assumption that the densities gt vary with t in a systematic way. This setup will 
be referred to as the discrete time model in the following. Lemma 4, proven in the Appendix, 
characterizes the induced fitness distribution.
LEMMA 4: In the discrete time model, fitness levels are distributed in χ = [0, 1] according to 
the density
(11) f (x) =  ∑ 
t=0
 ˆ 
 
 t(x)
 
pt __δt  gt a x __ δt b ,
16 Note that actual fitness implications need not be observable. Through consumption, the agent will, rather, learn 
about characteristics such as nutritional value or health impacts.
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where tˆ(x) is the largest waiting time t for which x ≤ δt holds.
Observe that the fitness density f (x) is left-continuous with possible downward jumps at the 
points x = δt for t = 1, … , T. A jump occurs because slightly larger fitness levels than x are no 
longer attainable with a waiting time of  ˆ  
 
 t(x) if x = δt, i.e.,  ˆ    t(x) is a step function with downward 
jumps at x = δt, t = 1, … , T. The following sections will repeatedly make use of different versions 
of the discrete time model.
B. Multiple Selves
The idea of context-specific utility functions as an optimal solution in the presence of sepa-
rable decision situations was introduced in Section ID. Consider, then, a modified version of the 
discrete time model, where the agent faces two possible choice situations. The first one involves 
short-run alternatives with waiting time t = 0 and payoffs v that are drawn from [0, 1] according 
to the density g0. The second situation involves alternatives with waiting times t ∈ {1, 2}, where 
t = 1 occurs with probability 0 < p < 1 and t = 2 occurs with probability 1 − p. Payoffs are 
drawn from [0, 1] conditional on waiting time according to the densities g1 and g2. The type of 
decision situation (short-run versus long-run) is revealed to the agent before the actual choice, so 
that an optimal utility function can be activated. Hence, a function u(0, v) evolves independently 
from u(t, v) for t = 1, 2. These two functions, or decision mechanisms, can be interpreted as 
the “multiple selves” proposed by Gordon C. Winston (1980), Thomas C. Schelling (1984), and 
George Ainslie and Nick Haslam (1992).17 In a recent study, McClure et al. (2004) find that there 
are actually two different neural systems involved in intertemporal decision making. Functional 
magnetic resonance imaging reveals that the limbic system is especially active when immediate 
payoffs are evaluated, while the lateral prefrontal cortex is relatively more engaged in long-run 
decisions.
The model thus offers an evolutionary rationale for the existence of multiple selves and explains 
“why either type of agent emerges when it does” (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 
2002, 376). The crucial assumption behind the result is that the individual faces either two 
short-run or two long-run alternatives. In the first place, this captures the intuition that most 
decisions are between similar options, rather than between arbitrary alternatives, projects, or 
bundles of goods. More important, it involves the implicit assumption that choices are irrevers-
ible. An initial choice between two alternatives (1, v1) and (2, v2) appears as a choice between (0, v1) and (1, v2) one period later. If the initial choice could be reconsidered, short- and long-run 
decisions would no longer be separate. Irreversibility appears as a realistic assumption for many 
day-to-day decisions in hunter-gatherer societies. In particular, most of the examples that econo-
mists refer to in the discussion of preference reversals rely on the existence of money, credit, and 
bank accounts, such as the premature spending of savings (Strotz 1955) or the effect of credit 
cards on savings (David I. Laibson 1997). On the other hand, “all illiquid assets provide a form 
of commitment” (Laibson 1997, 444), and storage is necessarily illiquid in hunter-gatherer soci-
eties.18 Irreversibility of decisions will be assumed for the rest of this subsection, but the assump-
tion will be dispensed with in Section IIC.
17 See also Richard H. Thaler and Hersh M. Shefrin (1981), Jon Elster (1985), Daniel Read (2001), and Drew 
Fudenberg and David K. Levine (2006).
18 For example, storage in primitive societies takes the form of somatic capital or intergenerational transfers (Robson 
and Hillard S. Kaplan, forthcoming), which makes any savings decision irreversible.
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The fitness of short-run alternatives is distributed in [0, 1] according to the density fS(x) = g0(x). In long-run decisions, fitness levels are distributed in [0, δ] according to
(12) 
fL(x) =   (p/δ)g1(x/δ)  if x > δ
2 
  u (p/δ)g1(x/δ) + ((1 − p)/δ2)g2(x/δ2)  if x≤δ2.
The utility function used to evaluate short-run alternatives is thus given by u(0, v) = cS  ∫0 v  fS(x)2/3 dx, 
while u(t, v) = cL  ∫0 δtv  fL(x)2/3 dx obtains for t = 1, 2. Now consider two long-run alternatives:
DEFINITION 5: The decision between y1 = (1 ,v1) and y2 = (2, v2) creates regret if (i) u(1, v1) ≤ 
u(2, v2), and (ii) u(0, v1) > u(1, v2).
Regret refers to a case in which the agent initially prefers the alternative with the larger wait-
ing time, but, after one period has passed, would prefer to reverse the decision. The main propo-
sition in this section states that regret will arise whenever the agent is accustomed to sufficiently 
small payoffs in the short run. To be able to formalize “sufficiently small,” it makes use of the 
following definition:
DEFINITION 6: Let h(v; λ) be a family of continuous densities on [0, 1], parameterized by λ > 
0, that satisfies, for all y > 0,
(13)  lim  λ→∞  
 ∫0 y h(v; λ)2/3dv   __________
 ∫0 1 h(v; λ)2/3dv  = 1.
According to the definition, raising λ shifts probability mass to the left, in the sense that the 
whole relative area under the function h(v; λ)2/3 eventually concentrates below y as λ → ∞, for 
any strictly positive y. This property is satisfied by several common distributions, such as the 
truncated exponential or a triangular distribution.19 It is now possible to state the following result, 
which is proven in the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 7: Assume that g1(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for any v1, v2 ∈ (0, 1) with v1 ≤ δv2, there exists a value  __ λ(v1, v2) ∈ ℝ such that the decision between y1 = (1, v1) and y2 = (2, v2) 
creates regret if g0(v) = h(v; λ) for any λ >  __ λ(v1, v2).
If the agent is confronted primarily with small payoffs in short-run decisions, it will experi-
ence large levels of pleasure u(0, v) even if v is small. This is a direct implication of the gen-
eral insights derived in Section I. Conflict between the farsighted and the myopic self is then 
more likely to occur. While the individual preferred the alternative with longer waiting time 
in the original decision, the earlier alternative becomes exceptionally tempting as soon as it is 
evaluated according to short-run utility.20 Immediate payoffs will indeed tend to be smaller than 
delayed payoffs, during our ancestors’ times as well as today, due to natural growth, interest, 
or because more important decisions are generally taken well in advance. These are the basic 
conditions that favor regret.
19 For the truncated exponential distribution with h(v; λ) = (λe−λv)/(1 − e−λ), it follows that 
( ∫0 y h(v; λ)2/3 dv)/( ∫0 1 h(v; λ)2/3 dv) = (1 − e−2/3λy)/(1 − e−2/3λ), which satisfies Definition 6. It is straightforward to check 
the analogous property for a triangular distribution with h(v; λ) = 2(λ + 1) − 2(λ + 1)2 v if v ≤ 1/(λ + 1), and h(v; λ) 
= 0 otherwise.
20 The model therefore explains why temptation (Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer 2001) can arise.
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C. Dynamic Inconsistency and Precommitment
Regret as considered so far is of a purely seductive nature. The agent would like to reverse the 
initial decision, but is not able to do so by assumption. As argued before, however, irreversibility 
of decisions is a much less plausible assumption for today’s world than for the environment of 
our ancestors. If the modern individual is given the chance to reconsider its choice, regret will 
translate into a decision reversal. Dynamically inconsistent behavior is the result of maladaption 
to a world in which decisions have become increasingly reversible.
Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) argue that reversals are the consequence of adaption to a world 
in which the relative fitness of two alternatives actually changed as time went by.21 The advantage 
of the present approach is that it sheds light on the often observed awareness of future inconsis-
tent behavior and the farsighted self’s urge to constrain the myopic self.22 Successful precom-
mitment makes long-run decisions irreversible and thus preserves the advantage of maintaining 
specialized decision mechanisms. One should therefore expect some degree of “sophistication” 
(Strotz 1955) to coevolve with multiple selves. The coexistence of potentially conflicting decision 
mechanisms and the ability to foresee future choice inconsistencies is then not at all paradoxi-
cal: context-specific utility functions make better choices possible, and self-constraints prevent 
wrong utility functions from interfering later.
III. Attitudes toward Risk
Some first implications for the curvature properties of optimal utility functions follow imme-
diately. Assume again that individuals choose directly between fitness levels from χ = [a, b], 
which are drawn and offered according to a density f (x). Under the assumption that f is differen-
tiable, the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of absolute risk aversion RAu and RAV for the two functions 
u and V can then easily be calculated:
COROLLARY 8: If f (x) is differentiable and f (x) > 0,
(14) RAV(x) = −  f ′(x) ____f (x)  and  RAu(x) = −  2 __ 3  
f ′(x) ____
f (x) .
Both u(x) and V(x) will be locally concave (convex) where f (x) is strictly decreasing (increas-
ing). This corresponds to areas where choices involve alternatives with small payoffs more (less) 
often than alternatives with large payoffs. Assume, for example, that χ = [0, b], b > 0, and alter-
natives are drawn from χ according to a truncated exponential distribution with rate parameter 
λ > 0, so that f (x) = (λe−λx)/(1 − e−λb) is strictly decreasing in x. The parameter λ measures how 
frequently choices involve small fitness levels. As λ grows, probability mass is shifted toward 
smaller alternatives. It now follows that RAV = λ and RAu = (2λ)/3, i.e., both u(x) and V(x) 
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. Risk aversion is, however, still decreasing in the sense 
that a decrease in λ, which corresponds to a shift of probability mass to larger payoffs, reduces 
risk aversion.
21 They assume that payoffs can always be realized earlier than expected. If early realization does not occur, the later 
alternative becomes relatively less fit. Sozou (1998) also discusses the evolution of nonexponential discounting, but the 
model does not explain dynamic inconsistency as considered here.
22 Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002), for example, pose the question why “farsighted selves often 
attempt to control the behaviors of myopic selves, but never the reverse” (376).
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Assume now that f (x) is single-peaked with peak in the interior of χ. This appears as a sensible 
description of hunter-gatherers’ environment and today’s decision situations, where most oppor-
tunities involve mid-sized rather than extremely small or large payoffs.
COROLLARY 9: If f is continuous and single-peaked with peak at  ˆ  
 
 x ∈ (a, b), then both u(x) and 
V(x) are S-shaped with inflection point  ˆ    x.
A utility function as described in the corollary resembles the value function used in prospect 
theory.23 Two main insights derive from this analysis. First, it delivers an evolutionary foundation 
for the “principle of diminishing sensitivity” to payoffs (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). It has 
been the main argument in Section I that an individual’s hedonic sensitivity will decline toward 
payoffs that are rarely encountered, and thus toward the extremes under reasonable assump-
tions.24 Second,  ˆ  
 
 x can be interpreted as the decision maker’s reference point. Decisions among 
alternatives close to  ˆ  
 
 x are most likely, and the agent will be accustomed to this level. Hence, 
even though the agent’s payoff fluctuates over time, the reference point does not adjust to any 
newly experienced payoff. It will remain fixed as long as the density f (x) remains the same. 
Adjustments of the reference point should therefore not be expected in response to random payoff 
realizations, but only to systematic changes of the environment, which in turn might be indicated 
by an accumulation of previously uncommon payoffs.
An additional feature of prospect theory is loss aversion, the fact that losses relative to the 
reference point seem to have a larger impact on individuals than gains of the same size. This 
has inspired the conjecture that gains and losses are evaluated by separate neural mechanisms, 
a hypothesis not confirmed by the results of Sabrina M. Tom et al. (2007). Instead, they find a 
neural correlate of behavioral loss aversion in a single neural system, which in addition is known 
to be responsible for hedonic experiences.25 Within this system, “the (negative) slope of the 
decrease in activity for increasing losses was greater than the slope of the increase in activity for 
increasing gains in a majority of participants” (517).
The apparent existence of a single hedonic evaluation mechanism for gains and losses is in 
line with the approach in this section. Obtaining the necessary downward kink of the value 
function in the present framework requires a downward jump of the fitness density at its peak. 
What may appear as a rather ad hoc assumption arises naturally under reasonable circumstances. 
Reconsider the discrete time model from Section II, with just two time periods (T = 1). To cap-
ture the idea that instantaneous payoffs are usually smaller than later payoffs, for example, due 
to natural growth, assume that g0(v) is strictly decreasing while g1(v) is strictly increasing in v. It 
then immediately follows that the induced fitness density f (x) is decreasing in x for x > δ. If, in 
addition, g1(v) is increasing strongly enough, f (x) will be increasing in x for x ≤ δ. The density 
f (x) is then single-peaked with a downward jump at the peak  ˆ    x = δ (see Figure 1), and u(0, v) 
has a kink at its reference point. In addition to discounting, there are other interpretations of the 
model that should be pointed out. An alternative (0, v) could represent a project with payoff v that 
an agent can carry out by itself, while the project (1, v) requires the help of a collaborator who 
receives a share 1 − δ of the payoff. Similar conclusions could be derived from other models in 
which alternatives differ with respect to a binary characteristic.
23 Rayo and Becker (2007a) show that their step function can become S-shaped if evolution cannot incorporate all 
relevant information into the happiness function.
24 As shown before, hedonic sensitivity is also influenced by the fitness function ψ. Concavity of ψ, for example, 
constitutes a reason for risk aversion. Except if this effect is strong, utility will still be S-shaped under an S-shaped 
distribution function G.
25 This system includes parts of the prefrontal cortex and the striatum.
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IV. Conclusions
Under the assumption that human decisions are motivated by the pursuit of happiness, this 
paper explains optimal hedonic utility functions as situation-specific tools for evolutionary suc-
cess. If utility can be perceived only in discrete shades, different utility functions are differently 
well adapted to a choice situation. Evolution will select a function which is steep in regions where 
decisions have to be made frequently and errors are especially harmful. If these characteristics 
differ between choice situations, hedonic utility will adapt. Application of this insight yields evo-
lutionary explanations for well-documented patterns of risk attitudes and for time-inconsistent 
preferences.
The general model of hedonic adaption reveals that the slope of utility can be interpreted 
as the degree of attention devoted to the respective area. The central result then confirms the 
intuition that maximal fitness can be attained by allocating attention according to cost-benefit 
considerations. This economic argument might provide explanations for several behavioral pat-
terns that present anomalies for the standard economic approach, among them what has been 
described as “mental accounting” (Thaler 1999) or “choice bracketing” (Read, Loewenstein, 
and Matthew Rabin 1999). Both theories are related to the multiple selves approach to time dis-
counting (Shefrin and Thaler 1988), and the present results might help to explain why different 
accounts or brackets exist and under which circumstances they become active.
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Figure 1. Single-Peaked Fitness Density f (x) (black) with downward Jump at δ  
(Based on short-run alternatives that induce the fitness density g0(x) and  
long-run alternatives that induce the fitness density g1(x/δ) (both gray))
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Appendix
A. Approximation of f
Assume without loss of generality that f is left-continuous, and consider a step density  ˆ  
 
 fS that 
approximates f as follows. Let yi, i = 1, … , D − 1, be the points (in increasing order) where f is 
discontinuous, and define y0 ≔ a and yD ≔ b, where D ≥ 1. Hence χ can be partitioned into 
D intervals on which f is continuous. Each of these intervals is then decomposed into S ≥ 1 
steps of equal length, so that there are S × D steps altogether. For i = 1, … , SD − 1, let π(i) 
= ⌊i/S⌋ be the largest integer smaller or equal to i/S. Then, define x0 ≔ a, xSD ≔ b and for each 
i = 1, … , SD − 1,
(15) xi ≔ yπ(i) + (i − π(i) S) a yπ(i)+1 − yπ(i)  _________S  b .
Now let χ0 ≔ Ø and for i = 1, … , SD define χi ≔ {x ∈ χ | x ≤ xi } \ ∪ j=0 i−1  χ j. Clearly, f is continuous 
on each step χi, i = 1, … , SD. Denote by L(χi) ≔ xi − xi−1 the length of step χi. Now define
(16)  ˆ    fS ≔  ∑ 
i=1
SD
 핀   χ i  fi 
where  핀χ i  is the indicator function of χi, and fi ≔ (1/L(χi)) ∫xi−1 xi f (y)dy is a value taken by f (x) 
somewhere on χi (by continuity of f on χi), which makes sure that  ˆ   fS is again a density. Since f 
is continuous and bounded on each of the D intervals defined above, it also follows that  ˆ 
 
 fS con-
verges uniformly to f as S → ∞. The approximation is illustrated in Figure 2.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Given a density f, the expected fitness loss due to wrong decisions can be written as follows. 
Assume a first alternative x ∈ [tk, tk+1] has been drawn from between two neighboring thresholds (or a boundary, respectively) that are located at positions tk and tk+1, where tk ≤ tk+1. Then
(17) W(x | tk, tk+1) =  ∫ 
tk
 
tk+1
 1 __ 
2
| y − x | f (y) dy
is the expected loss conditional on x. The unconditional expected loss between tk and tk+1 
becomes
(18)  W(tk, tk+1) =  ∫ 
tk
 
tk+1
 W (x | tk, tk+1)f (x) dx.
The overall loss of a threshold allocation is obtained by adding this expression for all intervals 
between thresholds (and the boundaries).
Now consider the step density  ˆ 
 
 f S as defined above and examine two neighboring thresholds at 
tk, tk+1 ∈ χi for some i ∈ {1, … , SD}. It follows that
(19) W(tk, tk+1) =  1 __ 6 (fi)2(tk+1 − tk)3.
Consider first the problem of optimal threshold positions under the constraint that exactly 
ni thresholds are allocated to step i = 1, … , SD. Whenever fi = 0 on some step i, ni = 0 will 
clearly be optimal. All following arguments then apply unaltered by simply passing over this 
step. Hence, for the moment assume fi > 0 and ni ≥ 1 for all i = 1, … , SD. Whenever ni ≥ 3, 
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all thresholds in χi must clearly be equidistant. This follows from observing that the distance 
between two thresholds enters the loss as a cubic term. Whenever ni ≥ 2, the thresholds span 
ni − 1 intervals of length li in the interior of χi, where the dependency of li on the whole profile 
n1, … , nSD is omitted for notational simplicity. There is one additional interval between a and 
the first threshold, and one additional interval between the last threshold and b. Furthermore, for 
each i = 1, … , SD − 1, there is one interval between the last threshold in χi and the first threshold 
in χi+1. A simple example is given in Figure 3, panel A.
Let n1(n), … , nSD(n) describe the optimal number of thresholds on each step if there are n 
thresholds altogether, which satisfies  ∑ i=1 SD ni(n) = n.26 As n → ∞, clearly ni(n) → ∞ for at 
least one step i, which implies limn→∞ li = 0. Assume that one interior threshold is removed 
from χi, while all other thresholds remain unchanged. This increases the loss by (1/6)(fi)2(2li)3 − (2/6)(fi)2(li)3 = (fi)2(li)3, which goes to zero as n → ∞. This implies that the distance between any 
two neighboring thresholds (or the boundaries a or b, respectively) has to go to zero as n → ∞. 
If it did not for two thresholds tk and tk+1, relocating an interior threshold from χi to the interval (tk, tk+1) would eventually (for large enough n) decrease the overall loss. Hence, ni(n) → ∞ 
as n → ∞ for all i = 1, … , SD. Furthermore, limn→∞(ni(n) − 1)li = L(χi).
Now consider a stronger necessary condition for optimality of ni(n), i = 1, … , SD, where n 
is assumed to be large enough to imply ni(n) ≥ 3 for all i = 1, … , SD. After taking one interior 
threshold out of step χi, keep only the first and the last threshold in χi fixed, and rearrange the 
remaining thresholds in between to make them equidistant again. This increases the loss by
26 The dependency of ni, i = 1, … , SD, on n will sometimes be omitted for notational simplicity below.
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Figure 2. A Left-Continuous Density f (Gray) with One Discontinuity (D = 2) Is Approximated  
by a Left-Continuous Step Density (Black) with Six Steps (S = 3)
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(20)  1 __ 
6
(fi)2(li)3(ni − 1)3 c 1 _______ (ni − 2)2  −   1 _______ (ni − 1)2  d .
Similarly, keep the first and last threshold in χ j, j ≠ i, fixed, add the additional threshold in 
between, and rearrange to equidistant positions (as illustrated in Figure 3, panel B). This 
decreases the loss by
(21)  1 __ 
6
( fj)2(lj)3(nj − 1)3 c 1 _______ (nj − 1)2   −   1 ____ (nj)2 d .
The condition for this not to decrease the overall loss can be rearranged to
(22)  a nj _____ 
ni − 1 b 2  a nj − 1 _____ni − 2  b 2 a 2ni − 3 ______2nj − 1  b ≥  a fj __ fib 2  c  (nj − 1)lj _______(ni − 1)li d 3 .
If the same argument is repeated for the relocation of a threshold from step j to step i, one 
obtains
(23)  a nj − 1 _____
ni
  b 2  a nj − 2 _____
ni − 1  b 2 a 2ni − 1 ______2nj − 3  b ≤  a fj __ fib 2  c  (nj − 1)lj _______(ni − 1)li d 3 .
Figure 3. Panel A: Step Density with 2 Steps, N = 7, N1 = 3, N2 = 4.  
Panel B: A Threshold is Moved from Step χ2 to Step χ1 as Described in the Proof
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As n → ∞, the identical right-hand side of (22) and (23) converges to (fj/fi)2(L(χ j)/L(χi))3 from 
the considerations above. Denote the left-hand side of (22) by aij(n) and the left-hand side of (23) 
by bij(n). Since ni, nj → ∞ as n → ∞, it follows that limn→∞(aij(n)/bij(n)) = 1. It then follows 
by a straightforward argument that limn→∞aij(n) = limn→∞bij(n) = ( fj /fi)2(L(χ j)/L(χi))3 must 
hold, since otherwise either (22) or (23) would be violated for large n. Given existence of this 
limit, it also holds that limn→∞aij(n) = limn→∞bij(n) = limn→∞(nj /ni)3, so that the limit opti-
mality condition becomes
(24)  lim  
n→∞  
nj(n) _____
ni(n)  =  a fj __ fib 2/3 a L(χ j) ____L(χi)  b
for all i, j = 1, … , SD, i ≠ j.
By fixing i and adding (24) for all j = 1, … , SD, it follows that
(25)  lim  
n→∞  
ni(n) _____
n  =  
 fi  
2/3 L(χi)  __________  
 ∑ j=1 SD   f j   2/3 L(χ j)  
for all i = 1, … , SD. This condition now also applies to steps where fi = 0.
Now examine un,S(x) ≔ θn,S(x)/n. Denote by σS(x) the number of the step on which x is 
located, i.e., x ∈  χ  σ S(x) . It now follows that
(26) uS(x) ≔  lim  
n→∞  
θn,S(x) _____
n  =  
 ∑ i=1 σS(x)−1  f i  2/3 L(χi) + γ(x, S) f  σS(x) 2/3    ______________________
 ∑ j=1 SD  f  j  2/3 L(χ j)  
where γ (x, S) = x − xσS(x)−1 is the distance between x and the lower end of the step on 
which it is located. Observe that  f i 
   2/3 is a value taken by the function f (x)2/3 somewhere on χi, 
because fi is taken by f (x) somewhere on χi. Furthermore, f (x)2/3 is Riemann-integrable since it 
is bounded and has finitely many discontinuities on [a, b]. We thus obtain
(27) u(x) ≔  lim  
S→∞ uS(x) = c  ∫  
a
 
x
f (y)2/3 dy,
where c = ( ∫a b f (y)2/3 dy)−1 is a normalizing constant.
The result on V(x) stated in Theorem 1 follows easily by repeating all previous steps for the 
probability of mistakes, where the probability of a mistake between two thresholds tk, tk+1 ∈ χi is 
P(tk, tk+1) = (1/2)(fi)2(tk+1 − tk)2, analogously to W(tk, tk+1) above. Hence, for this case, the tech-
nique used here yields the same result that Robson (2001a) obtained.
C. Proofs for Section II
PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
Conditional on having drawn t ∈ {0, 1, … , T }, the fitness levels are distributed in [0, δt ] accord-
ing to the distribution function ft(x) = Gt(x/δt ). Unconditionally, fitness levels are thus distrib-
uted in [0, 1] according to the distribution function
(28) f(x) =  ∑ 
t=0
 ˆ   t(x)
p t Gt Q x __ δt R +   ∑ t= ˆ  t(x)+1 T  p t ,
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where  ˆ  
 
 t(x) is the largest waiting time t for which x ≤ δt still holds. For waiting times larger than 
ˆ   t(x), even the best attainable fitness level will be smaller than x. It then follows immediately that 
f(x) is differentiable everywhere except (possibly) at the points x = δt for t = 1, … , T, with deriva-
tive f (x) as given in the Lemma.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
The condition that v1 ≤ δv2, or ψ(1, v1) ≤ ψ(2, v2), implies that u(1, v1) ≤ u(2, v2), which is 
condition (i) in the definition of regret. The assumption that g1(v) > 0 for all v ∈ [0, 1] implies that 
fL(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, δ]. This in turn implies that 0 < u(1, v2) < 1, because 0 < v2 < 1. Optimal 
short-run utility is given by
(29) u(0, y) =    ∫0 
y
h (v; λ ) 2/3 dv
  ___________
 ∫0 1 h (v; λ ) 2/3 dv .
According to Definition 6, limλ→∞u(0, y) = 1 for all y > 0. Therefore, there exists a  __ λ(v1, v2) 
such that u(0, v1) > u(1, v2) for all λ > λ–(v1, v2), which is condition (ii) in the definition of 
regret.
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